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Abstract
In the first decade of postcommunist transition, multiple growth regressions showed that the more radical and com-
prehensive market economic reform was, the earlier a country returned to economic growth and the more vigorous 
its growth, and that Central Europe took the lead. Since 2000, however, the Commonweath of Independent States 
(CIS) countries have had more than 4 percentage points higher annual growth than the Central European countries. A 
regression analysis for 20 postcommunist countries shows, with strong significance, that reducing public expenditures 
has most effectively stimulated economic growth. As expected, oil exports are also positive and significant. The distance 
from the European Union is also positive and significant: that is, the further from the European Union, the higher the 
economic growth. The effect of corruption is negative for growth but only marginally significant. Neither the laggard 
effect nor investment reveals any significant effect. The conclusion is that at least among postcommunist countries 
more emphasis should be given to reducing public expenditures to boost economic growth. 
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Since the collapse of communism in 1989, economic output in different regions of the former social-
ist camp has developed in starkly contrasting fashions. Initially, output fell sharply all over. From 1992, 
however, Poland recorded growth, and then one country after the other followed, though Ukraine and 
Moldova remained in the doldrums as late as 1999. 
  The lesson from 1989–98 was that market economic reform worked. The more radical and the 
earlier the economic reform efforts were, the sooner a country would return to economic growth and the 
greater the upturn would be. Central Europe and the Baltics shone, while the countries of the Common-
wealth of the Independent States (CIS) underperformed badly. Yet even the growth rates of the leaders 
were mediocre. We shall discuss these lessons in detail in the first section.
  Strangely, everything was turned upside down from 1999 on. From 1999 to 2004, 11 CIS coun-
tries had an average annual growth of 7.8 percent,1 while the four Central European Visegrad countries 
(Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) recorded an average annual growth of only 3.6 per-
cent. The three Baltic countries came closer to the first group with 7.1 percent growth, and Romania and 
Bulgaria closer to the Central Europeans with 5.4 percent (figure 1). We limit our investigation to these 
20 countries.
  How can this growth paradox be explained? Why did the pioneers of market reforms so quickly 
become the laggards in growth? This paper seeks to answer that question. In the second section, we inves-
tigate the facts and suggest variables that warrant further exploration. In the third section, we undertake a 
regression with the most interesting variables.
I. LessoNs from 1989 to 1998: trANsItIoN to A mArket ecoNomy Works
When the transition to a market economy started, recorded output plummeted in all countries, though 
the Soviet economy had already been in free fall. In 1990 only Poland and Hungary launched their transi-
tions. The sudden declines in their registered production caused a shock, and their relative economic 
performance set the stage for the early debate. When other countries in Central and Southeast Europe 
entered the transition in 1991, their output plummeted even more, but these falls were nothing in com-
parison with the CIS countries, several of which saw real collapse.
  Not only were the declines in output huge, they lasted for years. Poland took an early lead by 
returning to growth in 1992. By 1994 the whole of Central Europe and Southeast Europe registered 
growth, and three of the most vigorous reformers in the former Soviet Union had also arrived at growth: 
1. Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Turk-
menistan is excluded because of its extremely poor and unreliable statistics. All averages used here are unweighted because we are 
interested in the comparative performance of the countries. If weighted averages would be used, we would be preoccupied with 
the relative performance of Poland versus Russia since these economies dominate in their respective regions. Page 
Armenia, Lithuania, and Latvia. In 1995 other reformers followed, namely Estonia, Georgia, and Kyrgyz-
stan. However, several former Soviet republics experienced prolonged decline followed by stagnation: in 
particular Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Kazakhstan. Only at the end of the decade did they return to 
economic growth.
  The total fall in output was staggering. According to official statistics, the aggregate decline in 
GDP was 19 percent in Central Europe and 29 percent in Southeast Europe. In the former Soviet Union, 
the collapse was truly stunning, with 44 percent in the Baltics and 53 percent in the CIS (UNECE 2000).
  No doubt, these figures are exaggerated. Perhaps half of the decline can be discarded as the 
result of statistical misrepresentation (Åslund 2002, chapter 4). The old system exaggerated output for 
the sake of fulfilling plan targets, while the new system stimulated underreporting for tax evasion. The 
inherited socialist statistical systems could not capture new decentralized enterprise development, and 
the underground economy mushroomed, especially in partially reformed countries (Berg 1994, Johnson, 
Kaufmann, and Shleifer 1997). Terms of trade or implicit trade subsidies changed sharply, and substan-
tial Soviet subsidies to Central Asia were abolished (Orlowski 1993 and 1995, Tarr 1994, Rosati 1995). 
Shortages soon disappeared, quality improved greatly, and the structural changes were huge. Therefore, 
the statistical problems are substantial. In fact, many of the initial output declines have been reduced in 
later statistical revisions, which have succeeded in capturing more of real output. For our purposes, we 
have little choice but to use the official statistics, making the assumption that the later growth rates have 
been less distorted, though, like most, we dismiss Turkmenistan’s statistics as sheer fiction.
  Soon a huge literature on the causes of the output changes evolved (Åslund, Boone, and Johnson 
1996, Berg 1994, Berget et al. 1999, Christoffersen and Doyle 2000, De Melo, Denizer, and Gelb 1997, 
De Melo et al. 1997, De Melo and Gelb 1996, EBRD 1999, Havrylyshyn and Wolf 1999, Popov 2000, 
Sachs 1996, Selowsky and Martin 1996, Fischer and Sahay 2000, Fischer, Sahay, and Végh 1996a, 1996b, 
and 1997). By and large, it concluded that the more radical and comprehensive the market economic re-
form, the earlier a country returned to economic growth and the more vigorous its growth. The three foci 
of the transition were macroeconomic stabilization, deregulation, and privatization. As convinced reform-
ers usually pursued all three aims in parallel, it is statistically difficult to disentangle these effects because 
of covariation.
  Almost all transition countries started out with high inflation, and output continued to fall 
until inflation had been brought under control. Fischer, Sahay, and Végh (1996b, 89) concluded: “The 
simple—but essential—message that emerges . . . is that real GDP rebounds following inflation stabiliza-
tion, which in turn appears highly correlated with the improvement in the public finances.” In a broader 
international regression, Michael Bruno and William Easterly (1998) found that the critical threshold was 
relatively high, at 40 percent inflation a year. In addition, Christoffersen and Doyle (2000, 439) estab-Page 
lished: “There is no evidence that disinflation necessarily incurs significant output costs, even at moderate 
inflation rates.” Moderate inflation did not impede growth significantly.
Deregulation was the basis for the formation of a market economy, and over time regression 
analysis shows the rising importance of deregulation for growth (Berg et al. 1999). Privatization was 
always more controversial, but the regressions that included the share of GDP arising from the private sec-
tor showed that privatization had a clear positive impact on growth (Berg et al. 1999, De Melo, Denizer, 
and Gelb 1997, EBRD 1999). 
  The standard causes of long-term economic growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004) were of little 
or no importance. Surprisingly, Andrei Illarionov showed that the investment ratio in GDP was negatively 
correlated with economic growth: That is, the less a country invested, the higher its growth (figure 2). The 
explanation is probably that high investment reflected the maintenance of a soft budget constraint, a large 
public sector, wasteful public investment, and outright theft. Human capital was ample and underem-
ployed, so there is little reason even to investigate it. Overall, technology  and research and development 
appeared similarly irrelevant. Sensibly, nobody paid much attention to these factors. The issue was rather 
how to use the existing physical capital and import foreign technology to ease bottlenecks (Åslund 2002, 
153–56).
  Apart from the transition indicators, growth was correlated with the expansion of exports. 
Imports took off slightly later. The countries that were about to join the European Union benefited from 
privileged access to the large EU market. As a result, the share of their exports to the 15 EU members rose 
from half in 1989 to two-thirds in 2000. The CIS countries, by contrast, suffered from severe discrimina-
tion by the European Union, and the share of their exports to the European Union stayed constant, at 
around one-third (Åslund and Warner 2004). Covariation made it difficult to ascertain whether this was 
really a positive effect of market access or whether it was a result of the EU accession countries adopting 
many of the systemic features of the EU countries. A corollary was that the closer a country was to Brus-
sels, the higher its economic growth.
  With regard to politics, the 1990s evidenced a strong, positive correlation between democracy, 
comprehensive market reforms, and economic growth (Berg et al. 1999, EBRD 1999, Åslund 2002) 
because in the early transition, the threat against successful market reforms did not come from the many 
losers but from the few winners who engaged in rampant rent seeking (Hellman 1998). A corollary of the 
prior observations was that corruption was negatively correlated with economic growth (EBRD 1999).
  In conclusion, radical market reform, macroeconomic stabilization, privatization, EU accession, 
export expansion, democracy, and reasonable governance all went together. Analytically, one problem 
was that the covariance was overwhelming. Another problem was that the growth rates remained anemic, 
and only Poland had convincingly exceeded its economic level of 1989. A third problem was that the Page 
comparative standard—the CIS countries—were performing truly miserably. Thus, although one decade 
had passed, we could not really say all that much about the causes of economic growth, apart from the 
obvious point that a critical mass of market economic elements was vital. In particular Russia, Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan, and Moldova appeared stuck in an underreform trap (Åslund, Boone, and Johnson 2001).
II. A WorLd of opposItes, 1999–2004: 
     the WINNers Are the prevIous Losers
Strangely, whatever had been true until 1998 was subsequently false. The starkest contrast evolved be-
tween the four Central European countries and the eleven CIS countries.2 Year after year, the latter group 
grew more than twice as fast as the former (figure 1). This phenomenon could not be explained by sheer 
chance.
  The dividing event was the Russian financial crash of August 1998, which had many repercus-
sions for the whole CIS region. Several other countries underwent similar crises at approximately the 
same time, and the patterns were very similar from country to country. Most postcommunist countries 
maintained higher public expenditures than they could finance domestically for years. They had high tax 
rates, but they failed to collect much revenue. Instead, they ran up excessive foreign debts. Sooner or later 
they lost international creditworthiness as the international financial institutions refused to provide more 
credit. 
  On the verge of external default, or in default, CIS governments reduced budget deficits. They 
could no longer borrow money abroad or from their population, and tax revenues could not be boosted in 
haste. Therefore, they were left with no choice but to cut expenditures severely. Several countries slashed 
public expenditures by about one-tenth of their GDPs in a year or two, often when their GDP was falling 
sharply. These cuts amounted to one-quarter or more of total public expenditures. Bulgaria cut its pub-
lic expenditures as a share of GDP by 11 percent in 1997, Moldova by 10 percent from 1998 to 2000, 
Kyrgyzstan by 9 percent from 1995 to 1997, and Russia by 8 percent in 1999 (Åslund 2002, 226; EBRD 
2005, 53).
  Such drastic cuts are very different from ordinary budget trimming. When governments are fight-
ing desperately to avoid disaster, budget politics changes completely. What was politically impossible be-
came suddenly accepted as economically vital. One big  target for drastic cuts by most transition countries 
was enterprise subsidies, which often involved rent-seeking schemes, such as barter. As a consequence, 
enterprises’ budget constraints hardened sharply, and their playing field became more level. Another effect 
2.  We ignore Turkmenistan because of its substandard statistics.Page 
was that many former state managers who had seized control over their old enterprises but did not know 
how to run them under capitalism were persuaded to sell them to new entrepreneurs in order not to lose 
everything.
  After public expenditures had been cut down to size in many countries, the multitude of taxes 
and their high rates made little sense, since a broad understanding developed that these taxes could not 
possibly be collected. Then, tax reforms, introducing ever fewer taxes as well as lower and flatter taxes, 
spread throughout the CIS and to the verge of the European Union. As tax rates fell, tax administration 
could be simplified and tax collection improved. 
  In hindsight, the Russian financial crash was pivotal in turning the CIS countries into full-
fledged market economies. Their fiscal systems were put in reasonable order, and ever since inflation has 
been moderate. Most CIS countries derive at least 60 percent of GDP from their private sectors. Markets, 
albeit encumbered ones, drive their economies. A critical mass of market economy and private enterprise 
has been achieved, although the CIS countries continue to lag behind the EU accession countries, accord-
ing to transition indicators of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The 
EBRD index has changed little since 1998, recording only a slight convergence (figure 3). The minimal 
movement of these transition indicators amidst major structural changes suggests that the indicators 
might not be very relevant as a measurement of actual structural developments.
  Several dramatic developments followed the Russian financial crash of 1998. That year Russia 
devalued the ruble by three-quarters, and most other CIS countries subsequently devalued their curren-
cies by about 50 percent, which benefited exporters. The ensuing commodity boom, driven by Chinese 
commodity imports, allowed the CIS countries to boost their exports despite stagnant EU markets and 
EU protectionism. Supply rather than demand drove the expansion, as evident from the failure of all fore-
casts based on demand to predict the CIS resurgence. Although only four of twelve CIS economies were 
significant energy exporters (Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan), growth rates across the 
CIS were similarly strong. Commodity-poor Armenia has registered the highest growth rate. Nonetheless, 
to check the effect of major energy exports, in our regression analysis we introduce a dummy for the three 
major energy exporters in our sample (Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan). 
Increased investment followed the export boom, as would be expected, which has further re-
inforced economic growth. Extremely high foreign direct investment (FDI), motivated by potential oil 
production, spurred much of the growth in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.
  It is generally acknowledged that countries with a lower level of economic development ceteris 
paribus grow faster than wealthier countries. Thus one would expect CIS countries to grow faster than 
Central Europe after they had caught up somewhat with regard to transition reforms. However, this “lag-
gard effect” would hardly explain a difference of more than 1 to 2 percent annual growth between these Page 
two groups of countries (Åslund and Warner 2004). The laggard effect measured against GDP per capita 
in purchasing power parities (PPP) must be assessed.
  Clearly, additional factors are needed to explain a steady difference in economic growth of over 
4 percentage points each year for half a decade. One possibility is that this is simply recovery growth and 
that the main explanation is the huge, unused capacity in many post-Soviet economies after an official 
decline in output of about half of GDP, as especially Yegor Gaidar (2005) has argued.  
  However, striking systemic differences have developed in recent years. Most conspicuously, the 
CIS countries have drastically cut public expenditures to about one-fifth less as a share of GDP than in 
Central Europe, where it turned out to be possible to collect quite high taxes and international financing 
has remained accessible. This implies that economic freedom has increased in the CIS countries in a fash-
ion that EBRD transition indicators do not capture. A simple plot of growth against government expen-
diture as a share of GDP points to a negative correlation between these variables (figure 4). Although care 
should be exercised when interpreting such plots, more accurate regression analysis below confirms the 
strong negative association between growth and government spending. Thus public expenditure appears 
to plausibly explain observed differences in economic growth between Central European and CIS econo-
mies.
  Similarly, the CIS has adopted a low-tax regime, while Central Europe has taken only limited 
steps in that direction. Low and flat taxes are proliferating in the East, while most of Central Europe 
still has comparatively high and progressive income taxes. Russia has had a flat income tax of 13 percent 
since 2000 and Ukraine since 2004. Admittedly, Slovakia chose a flat income tax of 19 percent in 2004 
and Romania one of 16 percent in 2005, as tax competition stings, but Poland still has progressive taxes 
peaking at 40 percent. Corporate profit taxes are declining in the whole region, but payroll taxes are being 
reduced much more in the CIS than in Central Europe. 
  In addition, Central Europe has developed a habit of running budget deficits of about 6 percent 
of GDP, while the CIS countries have nearly balanced budgets, with an average budget deficit of barely 1 
percent of GDP for the last half decade (EBRD 2004, 41). 
  The CIS countries also have de facto freer labor markets than the Central European countries 
(BEEPS 2002). This is another aspect of CIS economic freedom that EBRD transition indicators ignore. 
The same could be said about agricultural policies.
  While growth and democracy were nicely correlated in the 1990s, we see the opposite picture 
after 1998. A simple plot of growth against a Freedom House democracy index suggests a negative corre-
lation between these two indicators. The CIS countries, which are by and large authoritarian, have grown 
faster than the democratic countries in Central Europe. Page 
  But what lies behind this? Have the Central Europeans just relaxed, while the CIS governments 
were shaken up by the Russian financial crash of 1998? The European Union is most probably part of 
the explanation. The first parts of the common legislation, the acquis communitaire, were undoubtedly 
useful, helping to build market institutions, while the last parts included regulations such as the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy. It is also possible that the old idea of authoritarian advantage has some relevance 
when the main risk to economic development becomes popular pressures for regulation of labor markets 
in favor of insiders and excessive taxes on the rich to the benefit of social transfers for the majority. The 
dominant risk during the first decade was rent seeking by elites, which democracy checked best. As before, 
neither human capital nor technology is likely to have had much impact on growth, as free resources have 
remained ample. 
III. regressIoN ANALysIs, 1999–2004
A. specification
To investigate more accurately the relative contribution of the major factors, discussed above, to the dif-
ferences in growth between the Central and East European and CIS countries, we estimate the following 
panel data model:
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where the dependent variable,  ti y , is annual GDP growth rate for country i in year t. The explanatory 
variables include ( / )ti G GDP , government expenditure as a share of GDP;  1, t i GDP−  
, lagged per capita 
GDP (in logs), to control for the “catch-up” effect; ( / )ti I GDP , fixed investment as a share of GDP, 
a measure of physical capital; Oil i, oil-producing country dummy, to account for the effect of surging 
energy exports;  i Corrup , corruption index, a proxy for the quality of political institutions; and  a CIS  
regional dummy. 
  The CIS dummy serves as a proxy for the distance from the European Union and stands in 
for other time-invariant, structural factors that differ between the Central and East European and CIS 
regions, such as labor market regulation. We control for common shocks reflecting global and regional 
economic conditions by including fixed year effects,  t l . The error term is composed of two parts: i m, the 
unobserved individual effect, and  ti v  , the idiosyncratic component. Page 
  Unlike the standard growth literature, our regression does not include any measures of human 
capital since all postcommunist countries enjoy relatively high levels of education, which do not vary 
considerably across countries and over the sample period and hence cannot explain the observed variation 
in growth. Nor does the regression contain specific labor market indicators since the data, even when it is 
available, are plagued with severe measurement errors. 
  Moreover, as it is now recognized in the econometric literature, simply increasing the number of 
right-hand-side variables in growth regressions is unlikely to take away the omitted-variables bias problem. 
Therefore, we do not here strive for the maximum generality and completeness of explanatory variables 
but rather focus on a few principal variables and robust ways of evaluating their impact.
  The error-component specification is well suited for this purpose. It allows us to exploit variation 
both across countries and over time, as well as to reduce the omitted-variables bias. For instance, any dif-
ferences in human capital across countries are captured by country-specific effects.
B. data
Our sample consists of observations for 20 transition economies—11 CIS countries, 3 Baltic states, and 
6 Central and Southeastern European countries—from 1999 to 2004. The GDP per capita (PPP) data 
come from the World Bank’s 2005 WDI report. The annual GDP growth rate and government expendi-
ture data are drawn from the 2004 EBRD Transition Report. Investment figures are from the UNECE 
databases. Finally, we use the corruption perception index scores constructed by Transparency Internation-
al. Higher scores correspond to lower levels of perceived corruption. The indicator displays little variation 
over time, and therefore the period averages, rather than individual year estimates, enter the regression. All 
the data are expressed in terms of ratios, obviating the need to control for population and country sizes.
c. estimation procedure
There are two major possible sources of estimation bias: first, the likely correlation of lagged GDP per 
capita, investment, and government spending with the unobserved individual effects,  and second, the 
potential endogeneity of investment and government spending—that is, investment and government 
spending may be correlated with the contemporaneous idiosyncratic error term.
  We first estimate the model with the fixed-effects procedure, commonly used in panel data 
regressions. This technique is robust to the presence of correlation between regressors and unobserved 
individual effects, as it removes the country-specific effects by subtracting time averages before applying 
the ordinary least squares procedure. However, the fixed-effects technique does not take care of the second Page 10
problem. Another shortcoming of the method is that it cannot consistently estimate coefficients on time-
invariant regressors such as Oil, CIS, and Corruption. Nevertheless, it provides a useful benchmark for the 
time-varying regressors.
  An alternative strategy that addresses both estimation concerns is to difference the regression and 
then estimate jointly the transformed equation and the equation in levels with the two-step efficient gen-
eral method of moments (GMM) procedure proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995). In this procedure, 
investment and government spending are instrumented with their second lags. The GMM estimator is 
consistent, asymptotically normal, and invariant to the choice of transformation.
d. results
Overall, the regression results support our main predictions: Government spending and energy exports 
are the key to explaining the differences in growth in the transition countries, economic regulation and 
corruption seem to have moderate impact, and the laggard effect and investment seem to play a negligible 
role.
  Table 1 summarizes the findings. The first column reports the fixed-effects method estimates. The 
second column presents the GMM estimates. We carried out a series of sensitivity checks using differ-
ent right-hand-side variables. One of them incorporates potential spillovers from neighboring countries. 
We rerun the GMM regression by adding the weighted average of the log per capita GDP for a country’s 
neighbors and big trading partners. The results are shown in column 3. 
  Throughout all the regressions, the coefficient on government expenditures is negative and 
strongly significant. It is significant at the 1 percent level in the fixed-effects and GMM regressions, shown 
in columns 1 and 2, and is significant at the 5 percent level in the regression with spillovers. Not only 
does it have the predicted sign, it has also the largest effect, in terms of magnitude, among all the variables 
entering the regression. The estimate implies that a 1-percent-of-GDP reduction in government spending, 
everything else equal, gives rise to about a 0.14 percent increase in the GDP growth rate. 
  As anticipated, energy exports boost growth. The coefficient on Oil is positive and significant at 
the 5 percent level. The distance from the European Union seems also to have a positive effect on growth, 
as suggested by a positive coefficient on CIS. 
  The coefficient on corruption, which proxies for the quality of institutions, is positive and mar-
ginally significant, indicating that low levels of corruption are associated with higher growth. This finding 
is consistent with the preceding finding about a negative correlation between government spending and 
growth since high government spending, as a rule, goes hand in hand with high corruption. 
  The laggard effect does not appear to be a major factor accounting for the big gap in growth rates. 
The coefficient on lagged GDP per capita has a negative sign, but it is not statistically significant. Page 11
  Nor do these regressions reveal a significant relationship between investment and growth, though 
the estimated coefficient is positive. One possible explanation is that most postcommunist countries 
started transition with high initial levels of physical capital. Therefore, the marginal effect of additional 
investment is small. Another explanation is that it takes time for improvements in investment to trans-
late into growth, and the time series is simply too short to detect any stable relationship between the two 
variables. However, some previous studies (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004) using longer series for a larger 
country sample also obtained insignificant estimates. 
  The effect of spillovers from neighboring economies turns out to be statistically insignificant. 
The weights are constructed based on geographic distances between countries. Though not perfect, this 
weighting system accounts reasonably well for economic linkages between countries, such as trade and the 
costs of transporting goods. 
  Most of the CIS countries, especially the oil exporting states, enjoy considerably lower internal 
energy prices than the Central and East European economies. The sizable energy price differentials across 
the two regions are therefore deemed by some analysts to be the leading explanation of the observed 
growth differences. To test this hypothesis, we rerun the same regressions with an additional explana-
tory variable—internal gasoline prices in each of the sample countries. Gasoline prices serve as a proxy 
for domestic energy prices. Although we do not report here the estimates for those regressions because 
of some data problems, the preliminary estimates nevertheless suggest that our main results are robust to 
the inclusion of energy prices. It affects neither the sign nor the significance of the coefficients. Moreover, 
the magnitudes of the coefficients on the major explanatory variables such as government expenditure, 
oil, corruption, and lagged GDP do not change or change only negligibly. Thus the lower internal energy 
prices do not seem to be a major source of vigorous growth in the CIS region. 
  A substantial literature on economic growth and the size of the state exists but does not agree. La 
Porta et al. (1999) showed with empirical material from 200 countries that bigger government is usually 
better, but such a regression does not say anything about causality. The Scandinavian countries had very 
small and efficient states in the 1930s, which were therefore allowed to grow, and corruption takes a long 
time both to develop and to dwindle (Treisman 2000). The postcommunist region offers a particular 
starting position of states that are both large and highly corrupt. Our regression suggests that with those 
initial conditions a sharp reduction in public expenditures is the best way of boosting economic growth. 
Naturally, it would be desirable to reduce corruption swiftly, but knowledge and capability of how to do 
so are very limited. Yet we do know that corruption usually falls with rising income.
  It should be emphasized that the postcommunist state was no average state but extreme in most 
regards. First of all, by any measure it was much larger than the state in other countries at that level of 
development, whether measured in terms of taxation, public distribution, degree of regulation, or share Page 1
property owned by the state. As a natural consequence, it was less subject to checks and balances than 
most other states, and it was severely overstretched. Second, the postcommunist state was pretty parasiti-
cal. It did the wrong things, hindering economic development rather than promoting it, while antisocially 
redistributing from the poor to the rent-seeking elites (Milanovich 1998, Hellman 1998). Third, the 
postcommunist state was ineffective and inefficient because of a high degree of corruption in comparison 
with other states (Transparency International 2005). Thus, regardless of what one may think of the role of 
the state in general, in postcommunist countries it would be rather surprising if economic growth would 
not be boosted by a reduction of the size of the state, however measured. Some of the transition indicators 
measure the role of the state in regulation and ownership; we suggest adding the redistributive function of 
the state.
Iv. coNcLusIoNs
The main conclusion arising from our analysis of economic growth in the postcommunist region since 
1999 is that the sharp rise in the growth rate in CIS countries can mainly be explained by a drastic reduc-
tion in public spending and budget deficits in these countries. A second explanation, unsurprisingly, is 
that the commodity boom on world markets boosted that growth as well. 
  Contrary to common views, the impact of the laggard effect is not conclusive from our regres-
sion. The coefficient on lagged per capita GDP is negative but statistically insignificant. Growth in the 
CIS countries is tempered by higher corruption than in Central Europe, which is also born out by the 
regressions, though it is only marginally significant. Greater distance from Brussels also seems to have a 
positive effect on growth.
  In effect, the CIS countries have adopted the highly successful East Asian growth model lock, 
stock, and barrel, while the less dynamic Central European countries have adopted the EU model, which 
has not been conducive to high economic growth, even if some countries—mainly Ireland, the three Bal-
tic countries, and Slovakia—have managed to go against the current. That one model is generally superior 
does not mean that all its parts are superior. Depressingly, the CIS countries that have generated impres-
sive growth are largely authoritarian.
  International institutions designed to promote growth in the postcommunist world, notably the 
World Bank and the EBRD, need to incorporate these insights in their advice. For years the EBRD has 
shown how Central Europe has scaled its transition indicators, but it fails to explain why Central Europe 
has only achieved a growth rate of 3 to 4 percent in recent years. By contrast, Janos Kornai (1992) noticed 
that the Central European states had developed a premature West European social welfare system. This 
has turned out to be a social welfare trap with West European tax rates, social transfers, and labor market Page 1
regulations. These countries’ EU membership has reinforced these negative features and reduced their 
inclination to reform, while they ignore the Maastricht restriction, which is supposed to limit budget 
deficits to 3 percent of GDP, instead maintaining steady budget deficits on the order of 6 percent of GDP.
  The obvious conclusion is that high public expenditures and taxes are bad for economic growth, 
at least in the postcommunist countries, which were saddled with excessively large governments of poor 
quality. Unsurprisingly, liberal economic policy or greater economic freedom does promote economic 
growth. Consequently, international financial institutions should advocate cuts in public expenditures in 
postcommunist countries with poor growth.Page 1
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table 1  regression for gdp growth rate in transition countries
gmm






Constant — 0.0 0.0
(0.0) (0.1)
G/GDP  –0.*** –0.1*** –0.1**
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Lagged GDP per capita –0.1 –0.00 –0.00
(0.11) (0.01) (0.01)
I/GDP 0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Oil — 0.0** 0.0**
(0.01) (0.01)
Corruption  — 0.00* 0.00*
(0.00) (0.00)
CIS — 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Year 000 –0.010 –0.00 –0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Year 001 0.000 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Year 00 0.00 0.001 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Year 00 0.01** 0.01** 0.01**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)




2 R 0. 0.1 0.1
*** denotes significance at 1 percent, ** at  percent, and * at the 10 percent  levels.
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 Figure 2   Investment rate as a proportion of GDP vs. GDP growth rate
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Sources: De Melo et al. (1997); Havrylyshyn and Wolf (1999), p. 34; Åslund (2002); EBRD 2001, pp. 12, 14; 
EBRD 2002, p. 20;  EBRD 2003, 16.
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